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Abstract. The study examined the effect of corporate governance and audit quality on the quality of earnings. Corporate 
governance with board diversity is measured from the aspect of age and educational background members of the board of 
directors. Audit quality is measured based public accounting firm that audited by a big four firm/non-big four. The study 
measures the quality of earnings with discretionary accruals. This study used a sample of 160 non-financial companies listed on 
the Stock Exchange in 2010-2013, bringing the total observation in this study was 640 samples. The results provide empirical 
evidence that the age member of the board of directors does not affect the quality of earnings, a background study also does not 
affect the quality of earnings. Quality audits also show the results do not affect the quality of earnings. 
Keywords: gcg, board diversity, audit quality, earnings quality, discretionary accruals 
Introduction 
In simply good corporate governance also meaning 
as the system arrange and control company to make 
value added for all stakeholder (Sulistyanto & 
Wibisono, 2003). Indonesia has implemented 
principal of good corporate governance since 
economic crisis in 1997-1998. According to some 
practitioners of economic experts, the crisis in 
Indonesia occurred because there is no and weak 
implementation of good corporate governance in 
Indonesia. 
Implementation good corporate governance as the 
provent of business ethiquet and working ethiquet as 
the commitment of the company and it’s related to 
increase good will of company and value added 
(Sutedi, 2011). According to Dechow et al, (2009) 
good corporate governance is an oversight mechanism 
that can be applied by the company in controlling 
opportunistic management that can cause a decrease in 
the quality of financial statements in which the 
financial statements are as accounting products, which 
is one suggestion for the principal (owner of the 
resource) to monitor the activities carried out by the 
agent (management). The financial statements also 
become the main tool for companies to submit 
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financial information regarding the accountability of 
management. The financial statements are expected to 
meet the needs of those external and internal parties 
who lack the authority to obtain the information they 
need from the company's direct source (Boediono, 
2005).  
Looking into financial report by internal and 
external company expect giving a good quality of 
financial report. By fulfill this demand it needs to 
prepare good audit quality on the result of financial 
report. As explained De Angelo in the quotation 
(Mulyadi, 2002) that audit quality is the probability 
that an auditor discovered and reported about the 
existence of a breach in the accounting system audit. 
The auditors are to given the confirmation integrity of 
the report and become maximizing result and quality 
audited. One of the important component in financial 
report of the company distract external is the earnings. 
The increasment and decreasment of earning effect on 
decision made by the management. The quality of 
earning is the correct earnings and accuracy shown 
company operational profitable. Upgrading 
increasment of earnings if it’s reached to plan even 
over the target (Sutopo, 2009). 
The problems in this empirical study is whether the 
board members age affects the quality of earnings, 
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whether background study board members affect the 
quality of earnings, and whether the quality of audit 
companies affect the quality of earnings. The purpose 
of this study was to investigate the influence of board 
diversity of age and educational background board 
members on the quality of earnings, as well as the 
quality of corporate audit of the quality of earnings. 
Literature Review 
Theoretical used as the guidance to analysis and 
argument on the study. It needs on the study as the 
agency theory, and efficient market hypothesis. 
Agency theory used by Jensen & Mecking (1976) said 
that the cost of agency affect from unbalance and 
separated ownership between stakeholder and 
management company. Agency conflict need 
supervise to ensure manage by management follows 
the regulation. Efficient market hypothesis explained 
by Fama (1970) said that market will be more efficient 
if price make by market as shown in financial report. 
Kusumastuti et al. (2007) said that the increasment 
of committee members will make problem solving 
than the members of variety homogen committee 
board diversity will increase creativity and innovation 
in ciompany in other way heterogenetical in 
committee solution in problems needs more and by 
smart evaluating consistensy faces from the alternative 
taken (Kusumastuti et al., 2007). This study reinforced 
by research conducted by a senior official (2010), 
Carter et al. (2010). 
Kusumastuti et al. (2007) examined the relationship 
between age with the company's board of directors, 
with the assumption that the increasing age of the 
person will be more mature and can produce a much 
wiser decision. The study used age the proportion of 
board members over the age of 40 years. However, the 
results stated differently, that age does not affect the 
value of the company, the older the person, the more 
health problems encountered and causes reduced 
intellectual ability. The results of different studies was 
stated by a senior official (2010) which states that the 
age member of the board of directors have a significant 
impact on the financial performance of the company. 
The big difference in the results, the effect of age on 
the value of the company, and there is no empirical 
evidence stating the effect of age on the quality of 
earnings, encourage researchers to conduct research 
on the relationship, so that the resulting hypothesis is 
as follows. 
H1: Age member of the board of directors’ positive 
effect on earnings quality. 
 
Kusumastuti et al. (2007) said that nothing effect 
from a background study on management education, 
bussiness and economic of the board directors towards 
increasing value company in stake holders, to ensure 
research on testing relation between background study 
of directors towards one factory on stakeholders is 
ovality of earnings. 
H2:  Background study members of the board of 
directors affect the quality of earnings. 
 
The purpose of financial audit is to provide 
assurance regarding the integrity of the financial 
statements presented by management. Certainty 
regarding the relevance and reliability of the financial 
statements of the company is needed to help external 
parties in making a business decision (Barry, 2003). It 
is important for users of financial statements to look at 
Public Accounting Firm (KAP) as independent and 
competent parties as it will influence whether or not 
the valuable services rendered by the firm to the user. 
If users feel KAP provides useful and valuable 
services, then the value of the audit or audit quality 
also improved, so that the firm is also required to act 
with professionalism. Research on the quality of the 
audit of the quality of earnings has also been done by 
Francis et al, (1999), analyzing the effect of auditor 
reputation, long associated with the auditor and the 
client important. The results indicate that the auditor's 
reputation negatively related to earnings quality. This 
study uses the size of the public accounting firm under 
the auspices of the big 4 and non-big 4 as a proxy of 
the quality of the audit firm. 
H3: The quality audit positive effect on earnings 
quality. 
Results and Discussion 
The independent variable in this study is a board 
diversity as measured by age (AGE) and background 
study (BSTUDY) board of directors, and audit quality 
(KAP). The dependent variable consists of earnings 
quality as measured by discretionary accruals (DA). 
This study has several variables that control the level 
of leverage (LEV) company, sales growth 
(SGROWTH), and firm size (FSIZE). H1 regression 
models that age influences the board of directors of the 
quality of earnings as measured by discretionary 
accruals (DA) is:  
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DA = β+β1.AGE+β2.LEV+β3.SGROWTH+β4.FSIZE+ε 
 
H2 regression models that influence background 
study on the quality of earnings (discretionary 
accruals) are:  
DA=β+β1.BSTUDY+β2.LEV+β3.SGROWTH+β4.FSIZE+ε 
 
H3 regression models that influence the quality of 
audits of the quality of earnings is:  
DA=β+β1.KAP+β2.LEV+β3.SGROWTH+ β4.FSIZE+ε 
 
Operational definitions of the dependent variable is 
the quality of earnings as measured by discretionary 
accruals, calculated with the following steps (Dechow 
et al, 1995): 
TA 〖〗 〖EAT _It = CFO〗 〖〗 _it- _It 
_It〗 〖EAT: Earnings after tax firm i in year t 
_It〗 〖CFO: Cash Flow from Operations of firm i in t 
 
Calculating the value of accruals with OLS 
regression equation: 
_It〗 〖TA = α_1 (1 / A_ (it-1)) + α_2 [Δ REV〗 〖_It] + 
α_3 [PPE〗 〖_It] + ε_it 
_It〗 〖TA: Total accrual firm i in year t divided by total 
assets of the company i in year t-1 
 
ΔREV_it: Sales of the company i in year t minus 
sales of the company i in year t-1 divided by total 
assets of the company i in year t-1 
 
A_ (it-1): Total assets of company i in year t-
1.PPE_it: Property, plan, dan equipment firm i in year 
t divided by total assets of the company i in year t-1 
 
Calculating non-discretionary accruals: 
NDA〗_it=α_1 (1/A_ (it-1)) +α_2 [Δ〖REV〗_it-Δ〖REC
〗_it] +α_3 [〖PPE〗_it] +ε_it 
_It〗 〖NDA: Non-discretionary accruals 
_It〗 〖Δ REC: net receivables firm i in year t minus net 
receivables firm i in year t-1, divided by total assets of the 
company i in year t-1 
 
Calculate discretionary accruals: 
_It〗 〖DA = (TA〗 〖_It / A_ (it-1)) NDA〗 〖_It 
_It〗 〖DA: Discretionary accruals firm i in year t 
 
The independent variables in this study were age, 
namely the proportion of board members aged 40 to 
50 years for each year of observation, background 
study is the proportion of board members who have a 
background in management education, business, 
economics, and the variable quality of the audit as 
measured by a dummy variable which gives a value of 
1 for companies audited by the big four accounting 
firm and the value 0 for companies audited by KAP 
non-big four. 
The control variables used in this study is the 
leverage (LEV), sales growth (SGROWTH), and firm 
size (FSIZE). Leverage is calculated by total debt firm 
i in year t divided by total assets of the company i in 
year t. Sales growth is calculated using the formula: 
(sales this year - previous year's sales) divided by the 
previous year's sales. Firm size (FSIZE) measured by 
the natural logarithm of total assets of the company. 
Mechanical determination of the number of samples 
in this research is purposive sampling using judgment 
sampling method. Companies sampled must meet the 
following criteria: (1) nonfinancial companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and actively 
reporting annual reports (annual report) and financial 
statement (financial statement) for the period ended 
December 31, during the period 2010 to 2013, (2) not 
conduct corporate action in 2010 to 2013, (3) the 
annual report and financial statements are presented in 
local currency (rupiah), and (4) provide profile 
information directors in the annual report which 
contains information on age (age) and educational 
background (background study). Based on the criteria 
on the number of such samples, obtained a total of 160 
companies per year with a 4-year observation period, 
bringing the total sample in this study was 640 samples. 
 
Table 1 Number of Samples Companies 
Criteria Number 
Companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange 507 
Companies engaged in financial industry (88) 
Perform corporate action in 2010-2013 (105) 
The annual report and the Company's financial 
statement is not complete (86) 
Companies whose financial statements does not end 
on December 31 (6) 
Companies that use currencies other than Rupiah (47) 
Companies that do not disclose your profile 
information directors in the annual report (15) 
Total company used as samples per year 160 
Total observational study in 2010-2013 640 
 
This study consists of several tests, including: 
descriptive statistics test, classic assumption test, test 
the coefficient of determination, and a t-statistic test. 
Based on the descriptive statistics, obtained by the 
average value of the variable age was 0.44 with an 
average number of board members is 5 people. This 
means that the average non-financial companies into 
the sample only have two directors who are aged 40 to 
50 years. There are some companies that do not have 
board members aged 40-50 years, as can be seen from 
a minimum value of 0.00, but some companies have 
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all members of the board of directors aged 40-50 years 
as the maximum value of this variable is 1.00 or 100%. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
  N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
AGE 640 0,00 1,00 0,44 0,26 
BSTUDY 640 0,00 1,00 0,58 0,22 
KAP 640 0,00 1,00 0,36 0,48 
LEV 640 0,01 2,61 0,47 0,27 
SGROWTH 640 -1,00 5,03 0,20 0,47 
FSIZE 640 22,94 32,99 28,13 1,73 
DA 640 -1,89 1,93 0,04 0,19 
TTL  
BOARD 640 2 11 5 1,88 
Valid N 640         
This table is the result of descriptive statistical tests. Dependent variables include 
discretionary accruals (DA), the independent variable is AGE, BSTUDY, LEV, 
SGROWTH, and FSIZE. DA is a proxy for earnings quality is calculated by the 
formula modifications Jones (modified Jones'), AGE = proportion of the age of the 
board of directors from 40 to 50 years, BSTUDY = proportion of background study 
management, business, economics member of the board of directors, KAP = quality 
audit companies measured by dummy variable, the value of 1 for the companies 
audited by the big four and the value 0 if audited by non-big 4, LEV = Total Debt / 
Total Assets, SGROWTH = (sales this year - previous year's sales) / sales of the 
previous year, FSIZE = the natural logarithm total assets. 
 
The mean value = 0.58 for variable BSTUDY as 
shown in Table 2 states that more than 50% of board 
members of companies have an educational 
background in management science, business, and 
economics. BSTUDY minimum value is 0.00 
indicating that some companies also do not have a 
board of directors whose background management, 
business, and economics, but most companies have all 
members of the board who has the educational 
background of management, business, and economics 
that can be seen from the BSTUDY maximum is 1.00. 
The average value of the variable KAP was 0.36, 
the minimum value of the variable is 0.00 and the 
maximum value is 1.00. The average value of the 
claim that companies audited by the big four 
accounting firm, only 36%, while 64% of other 
companies audited by KAP non-big four. 
LEV control variable has an average value of 0.47, 
the minimum value of 0.01, and a maximum value of 
2.61. The average value of leverage that nearly 50% 
can be considered shareholders of the company in 
making decisions related to risk decision, because the 
level of risk the company cannot recover the assets of 
shareholders in the future is 47%. Variable 
SGROWTH has an average value of 0.20, the 
minimum value of -1.00, and a maximum value of 5.03. 
This indicates that the growth of sales of sample 
companies have not been entirely uniform. The higher 
the number of sales growth, the company experienced 
good sales growth. Variable FSIZE has an average 
value of 28.13, the minimum value of the variable is 
22.94, and the maximum value of the variable is 32.99. 
The total amount of assets has increased and increases 
show that increasing and so does the size of the studied 
company. 
The dependent variable discretionary accruals (DA) 
are a proxy for the quality of earnings with an average 
value of 0.04. A minimum value of the variable is -
1.89, and the maximum value is 1.93. Far range 
between minimum and maximum values shows that 
earnings management practices undertaken by 
companies varies greatly. DA high value indicates that 
the practice of earnings management performed by the 
company's management is also high, so the quality of 
the company's profit decline.  
After doing descriptive statistical tests, we then do 
research on the classical assumption test. This research 
is panel data, which according Nachrowi & Usman 
(2006) in Sustainable et.al. (2014), classic assumption 
test for panel data only multicollinearity test and 
heteroscedasticities problem, because the data panel is 
a combination of cross section data and time series 
data so it does not require free equations of normality 
and autocorrelation. Multicollinearity test to 
determine whether there is a perfect correlation 
between independent variables in a multiple 
regression model equation can be seen from the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). A good regression 
equation is trouble-free multikolinearitas, seen from 
VIF value ≤ 10. Based on the results in Table 3.3 to 
Table 3.5 below for all the VIF values obtained 
regression equation ≤ 10, so that the regression 
equation in this study are free from multicollinearity 
problems. Other classical assumption test is test 
heteroskedastisitas tested. A good regression equation 
is trouble-free heteroskedastisitas by looking 
Prob.Chi-square values> 0.05. Based on the test 
results of white on the fifth research model, the H1 has 
a value Prob.Chi-square = 0.8638, H2 has a value 
Prob.Chi-square = 0.8227, H3 has a value Prob.Chi-
square = 0.2031, so it can be concluded that all the 
regression model is free from the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
Tabel 3 Effect of Age on the Quality of Earnings 
  Sign Coeff. p-value VIF 
AGE ± 0,0285 0,5121 1,016 
LEV ± -0,2362 ***0,0009 1,012 
SGROWTH ± 0,0311 *0,0568 1,016 
FSIZE ± 0,2028 ***0,0000 1,020 
(constant) ≠ -5,5700 ***0,0000  
R-squared   0,4751  
Adjusted R-squared  0,2954  
F-test Sign (F-statistic)  ***0,0000  
N   640  
Hausman Test Fixed Effect 
*** Significance level 1%. ** Significance level 5%. * Significance level 10% 
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The value of Adjusted R-squared is 0.2954. 
Adjusted R-squared value that is greater than 0.05 
states that the independent variables and control 
variables AGE LEV, SGROWTH, and FSIZE can 
explain variations in the variable DA 29.54%, and the 
remaining 70.46% is explained by other factors which 
is not included in the research equation. Hypothesis 
test results H1 t-statistic can be seen from the p-value. 
The independent variable AGE partially no effect on 
discretionary accruals. These results suggest that age 
board of directors does not affect the quality of 
earnings, and although the directors of the company 
are at an age that is proportionate cannot prevent the 
company from earnings management practices 
resulting in decreased earnings quality. The control 
variables that affect the quality of earnings is leverage 
and firm size at 1% significance level, while the other 
control GROWTH variables that affect the level of 
significance of 10% against earnings quality. 
Background influence research study (BSTUDY) 
board of directors to do with the quality of earnings 
and generating test Housman test model as a fixed 
effect panel data estimation methods are appropriate. 
The study of these effects result in that background 
study does not affect the quality of earnings as 
measured by discretionary accruals. P-value variable 
BSTUDY is 0.2552 which means that the variable is 
not significant at the significance level of 1%, 5%, or 
10%. These results illustrate that even if a company 
has a board of directors with the appropriate 
educational background to the management positions 
that management education, business, and economy, 
cannot guarantee implemented by the agency conflict 
management does not occur that result in decreased 
quality of earnings. 
 
Tabel 4 Effect of Background Study Board on Quality of Earnings 
  Sign Coeff. p-value VIF 
BSTUDY ± 0,0562 0,2552 1,004 
LEV ± -0,2344 ***0,0010 1,012 
SGROWTH ± 0,0314 *0,0543 1,014 
FSIZE ± 0,2016 ***0,0000 1,008 
(constant) ≠ -5,5567 ***0,0000  
R-squared   0,4761  
Adjusted R-squared  0,2967  
F-test Sign (F-statistic)  ***0,0000  
N   640  
Test results Hausman Test Fixed Effect 
*** Significance level 1%. ** Significance level 5%. * Significance level 10% 
 
The control variables that affect the quality of 
earnings is LEV and FSIZE at 1% significance level. 
Other control variables that affect the quality 
SGROWTH profit by 10% level. 
 
Tabel 5 Effect of Audit Quality on the Quality of Earnings 
  Sign Coeff. p-value VIF 
KAP ± 0,0267 0,6625 1,335 
LEV ± -0,2296 ***0,0013 1,012 
SGROWTH ± 0,0318 *0,0514 1,016 
FSIZE ± 0,1988 ***0,0000 1,342 
(constant) ≠ -5,4559 ***0,0000  
R-squared   0,4749  
Adjusted R-squared  0,2951  
F-test Sign (F-statistic)  ***0,0000  
N   640  
Test results Hausman Test Fixed Effect 
*** Significance level 1%. ** Significance level 5%. * Significance level 10% 
 
KAP a variable with p-value 0.6625 does not affect 
the quality of earnings as measured by discretionary 
accruals. This means that the non-financial companies 
are being sampled and their financial statements 
audited by a public accountant's office under the 
auspices of the big 4 does not affect the level of 
earnings management practices conducted by the 
management company, which can make the company's 
financial statements be not qualified. The results are 
consistent with research conducted by Anita et al. 
(2015) which states that audit quality is proxies by 
non-big four KAP and KAP big 4 cannot reduce or 
prevent the occurrence of earnings management 
practices (classification shifting). The influence of the 
control variables LEV and FSIZE partially influence 
on the quality of earnings with a significance level of 
1%, while the control variables SGROWTH effect 
with a significance level of 10% on earnings quality. 
Conclusion 
This study aims to determine the effect of GCG as 
measured by a proxy board diversity age and 
background study on the quality of earnings, as well as 
the influence of the quality of financial audit carried 
out by the big four KAP and non-big four KAP. Total 
sample was 160 company with years of observations 
from 2010 to 2013, bringing the total study 
observation was 640. The results showed that age 
board of directors does not affect the quality of 
earnings, the results of background research studies 
show that the background study does not affect the 
quality of earnings. Other research results on the effect 
of audit quality on the quality of earnings show the 
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